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Uses of Environmental Mediation when Siting
Hazardous Waste Facilities
BERND HOI.ZNAGEL *

I. Introduction
In Western industrialized nations there is an increasing interest in using alternatives
to a "command-and-control"
approach of governmental regulation. In Germany the
possibilities for consensus and co-operation are presently being discussed as a method of
decision-making in the areas of business regulation as well as of media and environmental
law. The reason for this development can be seen in the difficulties of finding
administrative decisions for conflicts thatare extremely complex. Especially when faced
with siting such locally undesired projects as hazardous waste facilities, the administration
often encounters strong opposition from the parties affected.
The use of the American concept of "environmental negotiation and mediation" has
been proposed by legal scholars for different areas of German environmentallaw.1 It is
expected that consensus-based dispute resolution can be especially successful when siting
hazardous waste facilities. Because of this optimism a heavily funded research project is to
explore whether environmental mediation can work in the German setting. This paper
will therefore focus on the possibilities of incorporating the American experience in the
German administrative procedures. First, the present dilemma of siting hazardous waste
facilities will be summarized. Second, the basic elements of the German administrative
siting procedure and its shortcomings will be outlined. Third, a short description of the
American concepts will follow. Finally, some remarks about a possible use of
negotiation and mediation under the German Administrative Procedure Act will be made.

II. The Dilemma of Siting Hazardous
1. The Need for Additional

Waste Facility

State-of-the-Art

Facilities

Each year approximately 5 million tons of hazardous wastes require off-site treatment
and disposal. German hazardous waste generators ship more thirty per cent of this amount
to other countries. During the last decade, the main targets were Belgium and East
Germany. Two recent events will block these possibilities and increase the present waste
management crisis drama.tically.
The process of reunification shows that in the past East German administrators could
not enforce environmental standards. Therefore, the closure of all important hazardous
waste disposal sites can be expected in the near future. In Belgium, most of the wastes
imported have been burned by incineration ships on the North Sea. However, after the
1987 international conference on the future of the North Sea, incineration has to be
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reduced by sixty-five per cent in 1991 and will be completely prohibited in 1994.
The increasing need for domestic treatment and disposal capacities caused by these
two developments cannot be fulfilled by the existing facilities in West Germany. The
Ministry of Environmental
Affaires recently pointed out that ten additional waste
incineration plants are needed to provide capacity for 1.6 million tons of flammable
wastes. However, during the last ten years aU attempts to site new commercial hazardous
waste facilities have failed. One of the major obstacles in implementing construction
plans is pubic opposition.

2. Public

Opposition

as a Major

Obstacle for New Facilities

Like in the United States and Canada public opposition is found in West Germany
mainly among local residents, their elected officials, and state politicians who have a local
political constituency. However, resistance to siting decisions is also organized by
nationwide environmental groups, or even national political parties like the Greens.
Opponents of hazardous waste facilities adopt a wide range of tactics to delay or to
stop siting attempts. A very common tactic applied by the local residents in opposing
new facilities is vocal participation during public hearings and the initiation of law suits.
Although the use of these methods may not stop the whole project, they may increase the
cost of its implementation. However, in Germany municipal officials are not able to
exercise the local police power to influence siting attempts. Because the Ge..rman
construction law2 provides for state pre-emption authority, local zoning by-laws and
ordinances cannot be enacted in order to block the siting of a new hazardous waste facility.
The dominant reason for local Qpposition is the fear of the major and long-term
health and welfare risks posed by the facility to residents in the surrounding areas.3
Studies show that concern about safety issues is the major component of public reaction.
It is generally recognized that such fear is primarily the result of growing public
recognition of hazardous waste mismanagement. Furthermore, communities envision few
benefits from proposed facilities. These facilities usually create few jobs and produce little
additional tax revenue. On the other hand, one can predict that property values will fall.
The stigma of being the "region's dumping ground" may also have a negative effect on
the local business community. Residents, however, are not only concerned with purely
economic factors. People also oppose new projects because they might be a nuisance.
They expect odours, noise and an increase of traffic on local roads. Furthermore, it is
argued that the aesthetics and the quality of life in the area concerned will be adversely
impacted. Another major reason why residents oppose new facilities is based in equity.
Residents near the potential site question the fairness of burdening their community with
a large share of risks associated with hazardous wastes while others receive the benefits.
Rural residents have been especially unwilling to accept wastes generated by urban
industries. Finally, the traditional participation procedures have been often criticized as
being unfair to the local residents. It is argued that before the procedures commence, the
crucial points of the project realisation plan have been already fixed by informal prenegotiations between agency and developer.

III. The

German

Siting

Procedure

and

its Shortcomings

Public opposition against the siting of hazardous waste facilities and other locally
unwanted land uses indicate that present participation mechanisms and measures of
2

3
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interest-balancing provided by the German Administrative Procedure Act are insufficient.
However, a search for alternatives only makes sense if the shortcoming of the traditional
approach have been analysed in detail. Before undertaking this task, functions and basic
steps of the German siting procedures will be summarized.

1. Functions
The main function of the German siting procedure regulated under §§ 72 et seq. of the
Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) is to prepare a decision about
whether and how a hazardous waste facility shall be constructed. Through the participation
of the citizen the agency shall be informed about advantages and disadvantages of the
project so that the final decision can be improved. It is worth noting that only one
approval of the developer's application from one agency is required. A positive siting
decision regulates all relations between the developer and the agencies affected by the
project. Other licences like a zoning or pollution control permit are replaced by this
approval. This so-called project evaluation procedure (planfeststellungsverfahren)
is also
required for the construcrion of federal highways, airports, railways, etc.
Furthermore, the participation provisions shall inform the parties affected and give
them the opportunity to make objections. This is of special importance because even if
the developer has been sued before a court for administrative matters, he is usually
allowed to continue the construction of his project. Because the facility is often almost
finished when the judges render their judgment, they are often reluctant to order its
demolition. In practice, judicial review is limited to recovering damages, even if the
statute would allow demolition. Thus, it is important to provide participation
mechanisms so that the parties affected can be heard with their objections at an early stage
of the decision-making process.4
Moreover, it is increasingly recognized in the legal literature that the procedures shall
also facilitate co-operative solutions of siting disputes between different interest groups
~dpersons.

2. Basic

steps

In order to initiate the siting process,s the prospective developer must hand in his
plan to the planning agency. The plan describes the project, its reasons, and its
neighbourhood.
Other governmental bodies like specialized agencies and the local
communities probably affected by the project will be informed by the planning agency.
For these bodies, the participation opportunity is limited to the right to be heard.
The local residents will be informed about the developer's application anct the steps of
the participation process through a nOlice issued in a local newspaper. The communities
affected have to "lay-out" (Auslegung) the plan in order to inform the residents in more
detail. For two weeks following this lay-out period (Auslegungsfrist), anyone whose
interest is affected by the project "may file objections (Einwendungen) against the
project".
The core of the participalion procedure is a discussion hearing (Erorterungstermin)
where all objections and official statements are debated. However, the.hearing is not open
to the general public. For example, people from other parts of the country are not allowed
to participate. Only the people who made objections or who would have standing may
4

5

The right to be heard an administrative decisions infringes one's right is a constitutional guarantee
(Art. 20 of the German Basic Law). This function of the' siting procedure is called
Rechtsschutzfunktion and has been recognised in this context by the German Constitutional Court.
See Bverf GE 53, pp.
The participation procedures are regulated in detail in § 73 Administrative Procedure AcL
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present their objections at the hearing. It is worth noting that under German law a person
has standing if his rights are infringed by an administrative decision. The infringement of
a pure social, economic or political interest is not sufficient to get access to the courts for
administrative matters.
Presently, there are only few rules and regulations about the hearing proceedings. The
statute only states that a "hearing officer" shall lead the discussion and a protocol has to
be written. In any event, the discussion hearing is not an adjudicatory, formal hearing
with, for example, the right of cross-examination
as in common in the American
administrative law tradition.
Finally, the planning agency renders its decision about the application and "the
objections which could not be resolved during the discussion hearing. The planning
agency is legally obliged to balance all interests affected in its approval. Conditions can
be imposed if necessary to protect public interests (Allgemeinwohlbelange)
or to avoid
negative effects for people who would have standing. At the end, the participants in the
procedure will be informed about the [mal results.6

3. Shortcomings
a. Informal Negotiations Prior to the Developer's Application
Empirical research7 has shown that, before the developer applies for an approval of
his plan, informal bargaining usually takes place. These pre-negotiations between the
developer and the agency are often as long as the formal participation process and in
general result in an informal agreement about the main issues of the proposed project. For
this reason, the complaint is often raised that participation procedures are merely a ritual
lacking practical significance.
b. Asymmetries

at the Outset of the Participation Process

Criticism has been levelled that there is an asymmetry of time, information and
representation of public welfare between the developer, the local community, and its
residents at the outset of the participation process. Before making the formal application,
the developer made the major technical and economic decisions. Typically, there is no
interaction with the local community and others who would be affected by such decisions.
Furthermore, the developer seldom mentions realistic alternatives when announcing his
technology and site package. Thus, local residents are confronted with an overwhelmngly
complex project which is advertised as necessary for the public welfare but which can
heavily influence their future life. Susskind has named this sort of decision-making
process as a "Decide-Announce-Defend"8
model. He argues for an early participation of
persons affected in the siting process.
c. Insufficient Possibilities to Influence the Decision
The objection and discussion hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
are often criticized as insufficient tools to influence the administrative decision. It is
argued that the activities of the participants are mainly limited to raising oral or written
objections. The local residents are not accepted as independent partners in negotiations
about the "whether" and "how" of the project. This participation model, however, is seen
as being usuitable for resolving ploycentric disputes involving many parties and possible

6
7
8

Judicial review is only possible against this decision. In general it is impossible to sue against a
"failure" in the hearing proceedings.
Mayntz, R., Bohne, E., Hesse, 1.1., Hucke, J., Mueller, A. 1980. Vollzugsprobleme
der
Umeltpolitik 318 pp.
Susskind, L 1985. "The Siting Puzzle". Environmental Impact Assessmefll Review, 52, pp 101.
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outcomes. Polycentric disputes are frequently characterized by conflicts about the
allocation of scarce resources. For finding an optimal-or
at least acceptable-trade
off,
the traditional siting approach is ill-equipped.
d. Insufficient Instruments to Recover the Social Cost of a New Facility
Finally, the complaint is raised that the statute does not provide a mechanism for the
local residents to recover the social costs of the project. Conditions can be only imposed
on the final decision in favour of public interests and the people who have standing.
Thus, interests of citizens whose legal rights are not affected by a new facility cannot be
sufficiently considered. Thus, detrimental effects on economic, social or aesthetical
concerns will usually not be compensated by the developer or a state agency. For
example, it is presently not possible to compensate a reduction of the local life quality
caused through waste transportations by requiring the developer to build a public
swimming pool or a local park.
In view of these shortcomings of the German siting procedure it is interesting to
know-how the Americans try to overcome the present dilemma of siting locally unwanted
facilities.

IV. Environmental

1. Reasons

Mediation

Procedures

in the US

and Areas for Application

In the United States, mediation and similar techniques have been used as an
alternative to adjudicatory resolution of environmental disputes for more than two decades.
Time-consuming and very costly court procedures are incentives to search for disputes
resolution methods that are consensual. In public sector disputes, adjudicatory
administrative procedures have become a reason for delay, or, in the case of siting of
hazardous waste facilities, do not work at all.
A reform of the traditional administrative and especially siting procedures has mainly
two aims. First, consensus-based dispute resolution methods target broader recognition of
all interests affected by the administrative decision. Compensation and mitigation
measures, like additional safety measures, the construction of recreation facilities, etc., are
necessary elements of the new concepts. Second, the decision-making procedures should
be recognized as fair and based on consensus. Otherwise, it is argued, there is no chance to
reduce the opposition and to reach acceptance among the parties affected of a proposed
facility.
At the beginning, negotiation and mediation were mainly employed on a case-by-case
basis, aiming to overcome the local opposition to the siting of flood control dams,
highways, public parks, terminals, etc. Now-a-days, consensus-based decision-making is
now part of a legislative scheme. For example, statutes in Massachusetts, Rhode Island
and Wisconsin authorize or even require negotiation and mediation of hazardous waste
facility siting disputes. Both ad hoc and statutory m~iation will be described briefly.

2. Ad hoc Mediation
a. Prerequisites for Negotiation
It is generally accepted that negotiation and the use of a mediator is not the
appropriate technique for every environmental dispute. Experts have developed three main
criteria to determine if a given environmental dispute is suitable for consensus-based
decision-making.
A prerequisite for successful negotiation is that win/win solutions can be created for
all parties. Disputes over value decisions are usually either/or questions and therefore not
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suitable for negotiation. The best known example where a compromise is unlikely is the
siting of a nuclear power plant. However, compromise may be a strategy for handling
distributional disputes. Here, the conflict arises about the allocation of a scarce resource
so that the finding of joint gains might be possible. For example, the necessity of new
hazardous waste facilities is presently not challenged by important interest groups.
Opposition usually emerges if somebody tries to concentrate all social costs connected
with a new facility on the host community. If the benefits are equal or even outweigh the
costs a compromise does not seem impossible. However, whether this optimistic
prognosis is true for all sorts of hazardous waste facilities is still an open question.
Futhermore, successful negotiation is contingent on bartering power. Each party
needs to have some power to exercise some sanctions over the ability of other parties to
take unilateral action. In negotiation situations, legal claims, the threat to resort to the
courts and other actual potentials for opposition work as bartering chips.
Finally, the participants at the negotiation table must be able to commit themselves
and their constituencies to the implementation and support of any agreement reached.
Only if the parties can be bound to their commitments are they willing to invest timeconsuming and costly negotiations.
b. Role of the Mediator
The mediator's primary purpose is to facilitate the negotiation process and to promote
an agreement among the conflicting parties. However, he has no power to impose a
solution.
At present, two major types of environmental mediation have been developed:
passive and active mediation. In passive mediation, the mediator is only concerned with
process issues, trying to ensure that the process is fair and unbiased in the eyes of the
negotiating parties: For example, the mediator is responsible for organizing the meetings
or reducing imbalances of power among the parties, especially the lack of information or
negotiation skills. Passive mediation is only used after an impasse or a stalemate in
negotiations has been reached. Because the neutral party is exclusively concerned about
procedural questions he would have no criteria to select the parties at an early stage of the
decision-making process. This argument is also raised when technical expertise or special
knowledge of the issues in dispute is sometimes considered as a negative factor for a
mediator. It is expected that such a mediator will find it difficult to separate his personal
assumptions, expectations and values from those of the parties and thus is not able to
fulfill his procedural tasks.
In contrast, the active mediator is concerned with both the process and the quality of a
negotiated settlement. In the literature a set of criteria has been suggested by which to
judge the outcome of mediation efforts. For example, the active mediator has to ensure
that the outcome (1) maximizes joint gains as judged by a disinterested observer (2) is
viewed as fair by the community-at-large, and (3) is reached in as efficient a manner as
possible. In consequence, the mediator can be used as a planning tool and help to
determine which parties are essential to resolving the dispute. Special qualifications are
regarded as helpful in order to meet the quality standards of a negotiated agreement.
When siting hazardous waste facilities an early beginning of the negotiations is
crucial for its success. Furthermore,
a negotiated solution has to respect legal
requirements like provisions about citizen partipation or technical standards. Therefore, an
active mediator seems more appropriate for resolving this type of siting dispute. In order
to get a better understanding about the process the basic steps of active mediation will be
summarized in the following.
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c. Basic Steps of Active Mediation
In active mediation, three phases can be distinguished:
and post-negotiation.9

pre-negotiation,

negotiation

00. Pre-negotiation
After the mediator has been appointed, the stakeholding interests and their
representatives must be identified. It is crucial for the implementation of a negotiated
agreement that all interests are represented at the negotiation table. This is also true for
the interests of future generations. Their representation can be secured through the
participation of trustees like members of a church or an environmental association.
The next step is the definition of ground rules governing the following negotiation
sessions. Ground rules outline (1) rules of confidentiality, (2) an agenda which identifies
the range and order of questions or issues to be addressed, (3) the procedures for dealing
with the press, and (4) the ways of financing the mediator and necessary technical
assistance.
bb. Negotiation
The negotiation phase begins with joint fact-finding. This involves a preliminary
determination of the information that needs to be gathered and analyzed prior to the
framing of specific proposals. Where less sophisticated parties are not well prepared, the
mediator has to assist them in developing their position and supporting rational. He can,
for example, propose the hiring of a consultant. Regarding very complex scientific issues,
even data mediation is possible.
During bargaining sessions, each party's underlying interests must be identified.
"Interests" are often different from the "positions" taken by the parties. By separating
interests from positions, it is easier to discover possible trades through which underlying
concerns may be satisfied. Trades tend to include commitments and concessions on a
range of linked considerations. Negotiated packages can include additional measures to
mitigate negative environmental effects, compensation, contingent promises, or other
benefits for the participants.
'fhe last step in the negotiation phase is the preparation and signing of a final
agreement. Participants representing broader constituencies usually need to return to their
constituents for a last review of a draft agreement. The final agreement must be signed by
all the participants.
cc. Post-negotiation
In this phase, the implementation of the agreement is initiated. First and foremost, it
is necessary to bind the participants to their promises. Here, it is crucial to link
informally negotiated agreements with the formal administrative procedures and decisions.
For example, the negotiation results can be incorporated in a condition of a license or
contracts can be completed.
In post-negotiations,
a mechanism for monitoring the implementation is set in
motion. This includes empowering an individual of a group to scrutinize periodically the
implementation efforts. In situations where conditions are subject to change renegotiation
or remediation can take place.
d. Practical experience

9

Susskind, 1., Cruikshank, J. 1987. Breaking the Impasse. New York: Basic Books Publishers, 93133.
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In the 1985 study from Bingham!O 133 cases in which mediation and similar
techniques have been used as ametlLOd of dispute resolution have been analyzed. Of these
cases, 100 involved site-specific issues and 33 involved policy issues. In 79 per cent of
the site-specific cases and in 75 per cent of policy dialogues the participants were
successful in reaching an agreement. When the decision-making body participated directly
in the negotiations, the parties at the table were able to reach an agreement in 82 per cent
of all cases. For site-specific disputes, the agreements were fully implemented in 80 per
cent of the cases studied. In policy dialogues the rate of implementation amounts only to
41 per cent. Although these data do not say anything about the quality of the negotiated
settlements and do not include numbers about hazardous waste facility siting attempts,
they show at least that negotiation and mediation techniques are a concept of resolving
environmental disputes that works in practice.

2. Statutory

Mediation

a. Reasons and Principles
The debate over negotiation-based siting techniques as a method to overcome .local
opposition emerged after the enactment of the first federal regulatory programme for the
systematic control of hazardous wastes in 1976. The Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act established a "cradle-to-grave-system" to regulate hazardous waste from the time of
generation to the time of disposal. However, the statute docs not provide guidance as to
whether or not and where hazardous waste facilities should be built. The regulation of
these two issues was left to the states. In consequence, at the beginning of the 1980s the
states enacted their own hazardous waste facility siting programs.
The public opposition problem is addressed by the state siting programs in two ways
which can be used separately or in combination: (1) diffusing opposition by providing for
local participation, and (2) preempting some local authority. In general, state statutes
provide for four primary methods of citizen participation: representation on state facility
siting boards, formation of local advisory committees, public hearings, and participation
in the site designation process. However, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Wisconsin
have attempted to introduce negotiating procedures as a way to broaden these traditional
participation possibilities.!!
In all three states, several features for organizing efficient negotiations were adopted.
First, a siting agreement between a local assessment committee and the developer which
is enforceable in court is required as a prerequisite for siting a new facility. It is expected
that the negotiation of such agreements will reduce local opposition because communities
are not simply required to say yes or no to a proposed facility. Instead, a community can
respond to a prol?Qsal including both the facility and a package of incentives and
compensation that offsets the social costs for the new project. Second, a local committee
represents
the community
in negotiation,
including community
officials and
representatives of the local residents. In addition, local residents can directly raise
objection against the proposal during informal public hearings. Third, technical assistance
grants help to the local committee in overcoming an unequal bargaining situation.
Fourth, deadlines for the negotiations and a dispute-resolution mechanism in the event of
an impasse were established ..

10

11

Bingham, G. 1985. "Resolving Environmental Dispute: A Decade of Experience" in Goldberg, S.
B./Green, E.D./Sander, F.A., eds. DispuJe ResoluJion. Boston: little, Brown and Company, 405415.
For a description of these procedures Holznagel, B. 1986 "Negotiation and Mediation: The Newest
Approach to Hazardous Waste Faeilitty Siting". Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review,
13, 329-378.
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In order to get a better understanding
of these innovative procedures the
Massachusetts approach as the classic example of a negotiation-based Siting Act will be
examined in more detail.
b. The Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act
aa. Siting Agreement as a Necessary Requirement
In massachusetts, before constructing a hazardous waste facility, a <1eveloper must
obtain (1) a state license!l in order to be consistent with the technical requirements, (2) a
site assignment!3 from the local board of health, and (3) a siting agreement with a
representative body of the host community called the Local Assessment Committee
(LAC).
The siting agreement!4 determines what measures beyond the state license
requirements will be taken to protect public health, public safety and the environment,
and to provide any compensation. The Siting Act lists, for example, the following issues
which can be addressed in the agreement:
(1)

facility cons:ruction and operation procedure,

(2)

facility design and operation procedures,

(3)

monitoring procedures,

(4)

services provided by the developer to the community,

(5)

compensation provided by the developer to the community, and

(6)

pro~sions
for resolving disagreements. It is worth noting that the basic
environmental and public health protection contained in the state and federal laws
are not subject to negotiation. Bargaining is aimed at identifying measures
stricter than or in addition to these basic standards.

bb. Initiation of the Siting Process and Formation of the LAC
In order to initiate the siting process, the developer has to file a notice of intent and
pay an application fee. The purpose of this notice is to inform the public and the agency
about the developer's plan. Therefore, the developer does not have to submit a detailed
design of the facility but only a general description of the proposal. Within 15 days of
reCeiving a complete notice of intent, the so-called Hazardous Waste Facility Siting
Council, which supervises the siting process, has to determine whether the proposal is
"feasible and deserving of state assistance". After this decision, a public briefing session
for the purpose of ensuring the participation of interested persons will be organized.
Afterwards, the Local Assessment Committee, composed of community officials and
residents, has to be formed. The LAC is the formal mechanism through which the host
community's interests are expressed in the siting process. The committee is authorized to
bind the community to the siting agreement. The LAC consists of a maximum of
thirteen members. The chief executive officer, the Chairmen of the Planning Board,
Conservation Commission, Board of Health and the Fire Chief are the five statutory
members. These five then chose four citizens. An additional set of not more than four
members may be nominated by the chief executive officer. The last group of appointees
may include representatives of the abutting communities.

12
13
14
NLSJ-8

Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1979, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21C S
7(1981 ).
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 111 S 1508 (1983).
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 210 S 12 (1981).
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For the purpose of facilitiating and assisting the community in its negotiations, the
LAC may apply for state technical assistance and planning grants. In addition to the
technical assistance grants, an environmental impact report and a social economic
appendix enable the LAC to analyze the project impacts and to gather information
necessary for effective negotiations.
ee. Formal Negotiations and Methods to Overcome an Impasse
Prior to the initiation of formal negotiations, the developer and the community can
voluntarily agree to use a mediator at their expense. If the parties have either refused a
mediator, or the agency feels that services of a neutral party would be beneficial, the use
of a mediator may be required. In this case, the third person is selected and compensated
by the agency.
If no siting agreement is reached within a statutory fixed time period, final and
binding arbitration begins. The arbitrator or the arbitration panel of three arbitrators is
normally jointly chosen by the developer and the LAC. If the parties tail to make their
decision within thirty days after the impasse has been declared, the Council appoints the
arbitrator.
In coming to a decision, the arbitrators must consider,
(1) the factual presentation of the parties,
(2) any host community, abutting community, and developer interests,
(3) the developer's management and operational history, and other relevant
information. The Uniform Arbitration Act for Commercial Disputes is applicable to
judicial review of the arbitration award.15
dd. Involvement

of Abutting Communities

Abutting communities also become directly involved in the siting procedure. These
):ommunities may petition the council for compensation to be paid by the developer for
"demonstrably adverse impacts of the proposed project". In filing a petition the abutting
community agrees to accept compensation as full settlement for any claim against the
developer for negative project impacts. After an adjudicatory hearing, the council issues a
final determination.
c. Practical Experience
Presently, in the United States there is no complete empirical study about the success
of negotiation-based siting statutes. Only information about the practical experience with
the Massachusetts and the Wisconsin Siting Act is available. In Massachusetts, since the
beginning of the 1980s five major attempts have been made to site a new facility: all of
them failed. However, in these cases the negotiation phase of the Siting Act was never
reached, so that to date the process outlined in the statute has not been completely tested.
The Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council hopes that two recent
projects situated in the cities of Braintree and Orange will go through all stages of the
procedure.
The Wisconsin statute seems to be more successful than its Massachusetts
counterpart. It applies to both hazardous and solid waste disposal facilities. The annual
report of the Wisconsin Waste Facility Siting Board from 1987-88 shows that since 1982
there have been 102 applications for constructing a facility. In 32 cases, a dispute could
be resolved by a siting agreement. Four agreements are concerned with the siting of a

15

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 251 55 liD 19 (5upp. 1984).
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hazardous waste facility.

Scientific research is necessary to explain the different results between the
Massachusetts
and Wisconsin apprqach. The Massachusetts
Siting Act might be
ameliorated through a procedural reform. An evaluation of the practical experience could
probably also answer the question rhether negotiation-based
siting statutes have a
sufficient potential for resolving disputes about locally unwanted facilities.

V. Possibilities
1. Approaches

for Environmental

Mediation

in West Germany

for the Use of Mediation

In many cases, American environmental law has been the model for legal reform in
West Germany. For example, the new statute about an obligatory environmentally impact
assessment when siting environmental dangerous facilities is influenced by the American
National Environmental Policy Act. However, the legal systems in both countries are
very different, such that it is important to find approaches for consensual decision-making
in the present German administrative practice.
Two aspects are important. First, although there is strong tradition of unilateral,
sovereign decision-making, negotiations can be more and more observed in different areas.
Negotiated solutions and siting agreements have also been used in order to resolve
conflicts about the siting of locally unwanted projects. For example, in the famous
STEAG case,16 which concerned the siting of a coal-fired power plant, a siting agreement
was under judicial review by the Federal Supreme Court in civil matters (Bundesgerichtshof)P In this case, a developer promised to pay 1.5 million German marks to individuals,
a public interest group and to the city of Bergkamen. The city was obliged to improve its
social infrastructure. The public interest group agreed to waive a legal right which could
delay the approval for the plant. The court held that the contract was valid. However, this
agreement was heavily criticized as immoral. In deed, in this case it was doubtful whether
compensatory payments could increase the acceptance of a siting decision. In the famous
Rastatt case involving the location of a Daimler-Benz automobile plant, the state
government of Baden-Wurttemberg committed itself contractually to provide financial
support for a new nature reserve to replace the old one. In return, the environmental
groups pledged to forego resort to legal avenues to block the planned site.
Second, the present practice of informal negotiations before the formal procedure
under the Administrative Procedure Act is heavily criticized. These cooperative efforts are
mainly limited to bilateral settlements between the administration and- the developer.
Thus, under this system of administrative behaviour, persons and organisations that lack
power to influence the outcome of the final decision are usually excluded from the
negotiation sessions. Legal scholars argue that the legal principle of procedural equality
and equal consideration of interests is in danger of being neglected. Furthermore, informal
administrative behaviour undermine the function of the participation provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act. Morever, they expect increasing opposition to bipolar
settlements from the groups neglected in informal procedures. As a w~y out of this
dilemma, the use of the American concept of environmental mediation has been frequently
proposed in the German literature. The mediators shall be responsible for selecting all
parties affected and securing a fair negotiation proceeding. Through mediation a framework for informal administrative behaviour could be establish that both facilitates
flexibility and embodies legal assurances.
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2. Frame-work

Conditions

for

Negotiated

Solutions

Under the German administrative scheme, some legal limits in using the American
techniques have to be respected. In. this paper, at best some important aspects can be
mentioned.18
a. Permissibility

of Negotiation

It is permissible to take formal procedures like the discussion hearing as an occasion
for negotiations. During this hearing all person who have standing and raised objections
shall discuss their concerns with the agency and the developer. Only when an "agreement"
about the issues in dispute cannot be reached, a decision on objections has to be made by
the agency on a unilateral basis.19 Therefore, it can be argued that the discussion hearing
is directed at achieving consensus between the participants. Since an "agreement" .
generally is reached only after negotiations, negotiation procedures are indirectly
legitimated by the law.
Practice show that informal administrative behaviour like pre-negotiations with the
developer takes place alongside the formal procedure. However, the German administrative
procedures is ruled by the principle of informality. If the agency is not bound to formal
procedures it has to act in "simple and expedient manner".20 Thus, informal administrative
behaviour is permitted as long as procedural commitments like participation provisions
and the principle of equal treatment are not thereby sidestepped.
b. The Use of Mediator
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the agency has a dominant role. The power
of administrative authorities to m'ake the final decision may not be interfered with.
Therefore, it is legally impermissible to transfer decision-making power to a neutral third
party and make him an arbitrator over the final administrative decision. In consequence, a
neutral party is not allowed to act as a "hearing officer" during the discussion hearing.
However, the agency is not prohibited from introducing a mediator to assist in preparing a
negotiated solution. If the neutral party is limited to the role of a helper during
negotiation
sessions, there is no principle of administrative
decision-making
responsibility to oppose this.
In order to give the mediator a more independent role, a legal reform would be
necessary. As is pointed out in the Bill of the American "Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act" from June 1990.21 the mediator could have, for example, the right to
resist the disclosure or the testimony concerning any dispute resolution document or any
dispute resolution communication.
c. Implementation

of the Agreement

Under German administrative
law, there are a number of possibilies for the
implementation of a negotiated solution. First, if negotiations take place at an early stage
of the decision-making process the application of the developer can be modified. Second,
administrative authorities have the opportunity to implement a settlement among the
parties via conditions to an approval. Third, the Administrative Procedure Act provides for
18
19
20
21
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a pubic-law contract, so that under specific circumstances the agency can be contractually

bound to a negotiated solution. Fourth, to the extent that private parties agree among
themselves on a matter, private-law contracts are the suitable form.

3. Outlook
The incorporation of the American concepts of negotiation and mediation into the
West German siting procedure-as
has been proposed by a number of legal scholars-has
some important advantages. First, all parties affected by an administrative decision would
be asked by the mediator to participate in the negotiation sessions. Important interests
would thus not be excluded from decision-making, as is the case in the present practice of
informal and bipolar pre-negotiation between agency and developer. Second, with early
commencement of the negotiations and a fair proceeding, all parties would have an equal
opportunity to influence the result of the final decision. In consequence, the present
imbalance of power at the outset of the formal decision-making procedure could be reduced
and the parties affected could be a "partner" in finding a solution to the disputes. Third,
negotiated compensation and mitigation measures could provide for a more interestbalanced decision that reduces social costs of a new facility and, consequently, increases
its acceptance.
All in all, the West German legal scheme allows for the possibility of expanding the
use of negotiation and providing for mediation. However, these new techniques are not a
cure-all for all problems presently involved with the siting of locally unwanted projects
like hazardous waste facilities. A lot of practical difficulties can be expected when
incorporating American methods of consensual dispute resolution into the German
political and legal system. For example, so far there is no experience in identifying and
selecting parties for a mediation procedure. It can be also expected that it will be hard to
change asymmetry in negotiation skills and information about the issues in dispute.
Furthermore, the use of a mediator and independent technical assistance will be probably
cause more costs than the traditional procedure. Presently, it is not clear who could bear
these additional costs. Moreover, the German political and administrative culture has only
a limited tradition with a consensus-based dispute resolution. Administrators, managers
and citizens will have to learn about the possibilities of negotiated solutions.
It is, therefore, recommended that, as was the case in the United States, limited
experiments be undertaken, thereby gaining experience. This is an unavoidable first step
before a reform of traditional German administrative procedures can be seriously proposed.

